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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 17-2221 
____________ 
 
JEREMY ARGUE, 
 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TRITON DIGITAL INC.; ANDO MEDIA LLC;  
VECTOR TRITON (LUX) 1, S.A.R.L. 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-00133) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 4, 2018) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 While working for Defendants Ando Media LLC and Triton Digital Inc., Plaintiff 
Jeremy Argue proposed a number of valuable improvements to his employers’ internet 
radio technology. After he was terminated from Triton, Argue believed that the 
companies had never fairly compensated him for his contributions. Argue sued in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming that his 
ideas were proprietary and that Ando and Triton had unjustly enriched themselves at his 
expense. The District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment for Defendants. 
We will affirm. 
I 
A 
 Triton is a technology company serving the internet radio industry. Triton’s 
software products enable radio stations to stream audio over the internet, collect data 
about their listeners, deliver targeted advertising, engage with their audiences, and sell 
advertising opportunities. Ando is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Triton, but before 
its acquisition by Triton it developed a significant portion of the products that Triton 
currently offers.1 
 Argue began working for Ando in 2008 as a Support Engineer. His written 
employment agreement stated that Ando would own any inventions, products, or methods 
that Argue created in the course of his employment. When Triton bought Ando in 2009, 
                                                 
1 Defendant Vector Triton (Lux) 1, S.A.R.L., no longer exists, having been 
merged into other entities owned by one of Triton’s corporate parents. 
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Argue became a Triton employee. Argue’s written agreement with Ando was never 
assigned to Triton, and Argue never signed a written agreement with his new employer. 
 Argue was by all accounts a productive employee during his time with Triton and 
Ando, as demonstrated by the series of promotions Argue received. In about four years 
Argue went from working as an Ando Support Engineer to serving as Triton’s Director of 
Audio Strategy. Each of Argue’s roles at Triton and Ando was primarily customer-facing. 
He would teach customers how to use Triton/Ando products, assist them with technical 
issues, and help them develop advertising strategies.  
Argue’s familiarity with customer needs also gave him a role to play in Ando and 
Triton’s product-development process. Throughout his time working for those 
companies, Argue would receive customer feedback and pass it along to his colleagues 
who were involved in improving their products. That role was made explicit in Argue’s 
official job description as he moved into leadership positions at Triton. As Director of 
Advertising Strategy, Argue was expected to “[l]iaise with other departments,” including 
the product and engineering teams, “to ensure that all products . . . promote[d] established 
advertising strategy goals and objectives.” App. 1188. But even before Triton listed that 
role in Argue’s duties, he felt it was “part of everybody’s job” to share customer 
feedback—regardless of whether it was “listed in the specific bullet points” of a formal 
job description. App. 1169–70. Argue testified that he shared feedback with his 
colleagues specifically so that Ando and Triton could “incorporate that feedback into 
[their] operations.” App. 1164–65. Prior to Ando’s acquisition, he even “worked 
specifically with the lead product manager . . . and the head of engineering . . . [as] an 
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informal committee to oversee, advance, and manage . . . products.” App. 1220. That 
team would improve Ando’s products by incorporating the customer feedback that Argue 
passed on. 
The parties do not dispute that Argue contributed to the development of Ando and 
Triton’s products. Some of those contributions originated directly from client feedback 
that Argue relayed to his colleagues, and others appear to have been his own ideas. Argue 
characterizes those contributions to Triton and Ando’s products as “inventions,” and 
maintains that because he was not “hired to invent,” those ideas belonged to him, not his 
employers. Argue Br. 20. In addition to disputing that Argue’s ideas qualified as 
“inventions,” Defendants maintain that Argue was simply “doing his . . . job” by 
proposing improvements to his employers’ products. Defs. Br. 28. In Ando and Triton’s 
view, Argue was already paid a salary to play that part, and no reasonable jury could find 
that it was unjust for his employers to profit from his efforts. 
Vector bought Triton in 2015, and Triton terminated Argue shortly thereafter. At 
the time he was terminated, Argue was paid about $108,000 in salary and received an 
annual bonus of around $5,000. Argue’s base salary had increased every year he spent at 
Triton, and he had never asked for additional compensation. 
B 
 Argue brought suit in 2016, asserting three claims for relief. First, he alleged that 
since his “inventions” contributed to Triton’s valuation in its sale to Vector, it was unjust 
for Triton and/or Ando to retain all of the consideration received in that sale without 
paying Argue for the value of his ideas. Second, he alleged that Defendants had 
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converted his “inventions” to their own use. Third, he sought a declaration that he is an 
inventor and an owner of several patents and patent applications—relating to  products 
called Content Wire and a2x— which he claimed were based on his ideas.  
 The District Court granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. The Court dismissed Argue’s claims as preempted by federal patent law to 
the extent they challenged the validity of any patent, disputed a pending patent 
application, or sought a declaration of inventorship. But it denied Defendants’ motion as 
to any claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, or declaratory relief to the extent that 
Argue could plead them purely under state law.  
 Argue filed an amended complaint, and Defendants moved to strike large portions 
of it as falling outside the scope of the state law theories previously approved by the 
District Court. The Court agreed. It struck all references to Argue’s ownership of patents 
or of materials subject to patent applications. Importantly, it also struck Argue’s 
conversion and declaratory judgment claims. The Court did so because those claims were 
not brought under the state law theory that Defendants had “converted [Argue’s] . . . 
work papers and work product,” but rested instead on the essentially federal (and 
therefore preempted) theory that Defendants had misappropriated his useful ideas. App. 
81, 83–84.  
With Argue’s case limited to a single unjust enrichment claim, the parties 
conducted discovery and Defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted that motion, and Argue timely appealed. 
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II2 
A 
 The elements of an unjust enrichment claim under Pennsylvania law are 
“(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff, (2) appreciation of such benefits by 
defendant, and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances 
that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value.” 
Mark Hershey Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 171 A.3d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (citation 
and modifications omitted). Unjust enrichment does not exist whenever one party 
benefits another; rather, a plaintiff must show circumstances that would make it 
“unconscionable” for the defendant to retain the benefit conferred. Id. (citation omitted). 
“The most important factor . . . is whether the enrichment of the defendant is unjust.” 
Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd., 666 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 Assuming without deciding that Argue made valuable contributions to his 
employers’ products, and that Defendants have been enriched as a result, we consider 
whether that enrichment was unjust. That issue turns on one factual question: when 
Argue proposed the relevant improvements to Ando and Triton’s products, was he 
essentially doing what those companies were already paying him to do, or was he so 
exceeding the scope of those duties that it might be unjust not to compensate him further? 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment, Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 207 n.16 (3d Cir. 
2018), and may affirm for any reason supported by the record, Grp. Against Smog and 
Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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There is no dispute on the governing law—Argue concedes that he “cannot claim unjust 
enrichment if [he was] just doing [his] job” Argue Br. 37 (quoting Bowden v. Schenker, 
2016 WL 3981354, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2016), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 
2017)). 
Argue described in his deposition what he considered his “inventive” work. First, 
he would use his “exceptional industry knowledge” to evaluate what existed in the 
market, what gaps there were in the market, and “what could help clients.” App. 1229. 
Then he would “distill[] that information down into new feature sets and new inventions 
that [Ando/Triton] could use to help [clients].” Id. Finally, he would pass those ideas on 
to the “product teams” at Ando and Triton. App. 1229–30. 
 The District Court found no genuine dispute that this was anything other than “the 
work Defendants paid Mr. Argue to do.” Argue v. Triton Digital, Inc., 2017 WL 
1611254, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017). We agree. Helping Ando and Triton keep up on 
trends and opportunities in the internet radio marketplace was an important part of 
Argue’s job duties. Sometimes that involved passing on immediate customer feedback, 
something Argue considered as a matter of “common sense” to be “part of everybody’s 
job.” App. 1169–70. Other times that meant traveling overseas for discussions with 
potential customers and visits to industry conferences. Moreover, it was always the 
expectation that Argue would use his industry knowledge to help his employers improve 
their product offerings. As Director of Advertising Strategy at Triton, Argue’s job duties 
included “[l]iais[ing]” with other departments—including the product and engineering 
teams—“to ensure that all products . . . promoted established advertising strategy goals.” 
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App. 1188. Indeed, the internal announcement of Argue’s promotion to that role 
specifically stated that he would “provide a channel of communication back to the 
product team.” App. 1325, 1331. 
In sum, we agree with the District Court that the record shows that by maintaining 
up-to-date industry knowledge, identifying needs in the marketplace, and proposing 
product improvements to meet those needs, Argue was simply doing his job.3 Because he 
did so voluntarily and without promises of or requests for additional compensation, we 
agree with the District Court that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants were 
unjustly enriched.4 
B 
 Argue raises two other arguments on appeal, neither of which persuades us to 
disturb the judgment of the District Court. 
First, Argue objects to the District Court’s decision to strike his conversion and 
declaratory judgment claims from his amended complaint. The essence of his challenge 
appears to be that the District Court abused its discretion by striking his claims as 
                                                 
3 Argue makes much of the fact that he was never specifically hired or assigned 
“to make inventions or develop new products,” Argue Br. 37–38, but that narrow view of 
the scope of Argue’s employment is inappropriate in this context. Unjust enrichment is 
“essentially an equitable doctrine,” Schenck, 666 A.2d at 328 (citation omitted), in which 
“our focus is not on the intention of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant has 
been unjustly enriched,” id. Whether Argue acted precisely within the confines of his job 
duties does not determine whether it was unjust for Ando and Triton to profit from his 
work. 
4 Because summary judgment was appropriate, we do not reach the District 
Court’s alternative holdings that Argue’s unjust enrichment claim is either preempted by 
federal patent law or barred by the written contract between Argue and Ando. 
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inconsistent with his representation at oral argument that he would pursue only non-
patent claims. Argue claims he never actually made such a representation, but we need 
not resolve that dispute to dispose of his challenge on appeal. In ruling on Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the District Court dismissed Argue’s 
complaint to the extent it asserted federal patent rights “under a guise of state law.” App. 
82 n.1 (citation omitted). The Court’s subsequent order granting Defendants’ motion to 
strike simply trimmed material from Argue’s amended complaint that continued to assert 
claims preempted by federal patent law in contravention of the earlier dismissal.  
Both of those rulings relied not on Argue’s representation about the scope of his 
claims—which the District Court mentioned only to the extent that they “clarified” the 
issues, App. 82 n.1, 84 n.1—but on an independent analysis of federal patent preemption. 
Since Argue makes no argument addressed to the actual basis for the District Court’s 
ruling, focusing instead on an essentially collateral issue, he has forfeited his challenge 
on appeal. 
Argue’s final claim is that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to 
compel Defendants to answer an interrogatory expanding on the affirmative defenses 
listed in their answer. Even if that were error, however, Argue does not contend that it 
independently merits reversal. Rather, he asks us to order discovery re-opened only “if 
and when” we vacate and remand to the District Court. Argue Br. 47. Our decision to 
affirm vitiates this claim. 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment. 
